126 ideas
1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
22752 | Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus] |
1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
18019 | People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor] |
17998 | Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor] |
18011 | Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor] |
18012 | Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor] |
18013 | Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor] |
18021 | Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor] |
18015 | The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor] |
18017 | If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor] |
18031 | If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor] |
18016 | Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor] |
18030 | A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor] |
18032 | Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor] |
18034 | Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor] |
18037 | Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor] |
18039 | If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor] |
18058 | Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor] |
18041 | Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor] |
18056 | Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor] |
18055 | In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor] |
18057 | 'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor] |
18059 | The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor] |
6021 | It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus] |
18040 | Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor] |
12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
6020 | 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus] |
1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
17997 | Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor] |
18060 | We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor] |
22744 | Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts [Sext.Empiricus] |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
22748 | Some say motion is perceived by sense, but others say it is by intellect [Sext.Empiricus] |
1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
20795 | Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus] |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
20794 | How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus] |
1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
22746 | If we try to conceive of a line with no breadth, it ceases to exist, and so has no length [Sext.Empiricus] |
22741 | The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it [Sext.Empiricus] |
18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |
1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
18035 | Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor] |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
18018 | To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor] |
1757 | The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius] |
18008 | Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor] |
18010 | 'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor] |
18053 | The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor] |
18000 | Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor] |
17999 | Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor] |
18014 | Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor] |
18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |
18036 | A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor] |
18051 | In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor] |
18043 | The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor] |
18042 | The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor] |
18047 | A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor] |
18048 | A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor] |
18049 | The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor] |
18050 | If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor] |
18054 | Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor] |
18024 | One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor] |
18023 | Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor] |
18025 | The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor] |
18026 | Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor] |
18028 | Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor] |
18029 | Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor] |
18022 | Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor] |
18027 | Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor] |
22754 | Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
22755 | Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus] |
3028 | The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides] |
22756 | If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus] |
6032 | Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus] |
1517 | The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus] |
1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
22747 | A man walking backwards on a forwards-moving ship is moving in a fixed place [Sext.Empiricus] |
1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
22749 | Time doesn't end with the Universe, because tensed statements about destruction remain true [Sext.Empiricus] |
22750 | Time is divisible, into past, present and future [Sext.Empiricus] |
1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
22742 | Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death) [Sext.Empiricus] |
22751 | If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
22730 | All men agree that God is blessed, imperishable, happy and good [Sext.Empiricus] |
22739 | God must suffer to understand suffering [Sext.Empiricus] |
1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
22738 | The Divine must lack the virtues of continence and fortitude, because they are not needed [Sext.Empiricus] |
22734 | God is defended by agreement, order, absurdity of denying God, and refutations [Sext.Empiricus] |
22736 | God's sensations imply change, and hence perishing, which is absurd, so there is no such God [Sext.Empiricus] |
22740 | God without virtue is absurd, but God's virtues will be better than God [Sext.Empiricus] |
1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
22735 | The original substance lacked motion or shape, and was given these by a cause [Sext.Empiricus] |
22732 | The perfections of God were extrapolations from mankind [Sext.Empiricus] |
22728 | Gods were invented as watchers of people's secret actions [Sext.Empiricus] |
22737 | An incorporeal God could do nothing, and a bodily god would perish, so there is no God [Sext.Empiricus] |
22731 | It is mad to think that what is useful to us, like lakes and rivers, are gods [Sext.Empiricus] |
1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |