19 ideas
22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
1757 | The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius] |
3028 | The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides] |