Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Euripides, J.L. Mackie and Henry Laycock

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
9283 Our ancient beliefs can never be overthrown by subtle arguments [Euripides]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
12797 If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12794 Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17694 Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
17695 Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
12792 The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
12799 Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
12818 We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
12795 Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
17696 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
12791 It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
4761 The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8337 Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8342 Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8343 Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
8385 A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
8335 Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
8336 The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
8333 A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8395 Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
8334 The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
1473 Is evil an illusion, or a necessary contrast, or uncontrollable, or necessary for human free will? [Mackie, by PG]
1472 The propositions that God is good and omnipotent, and that evil exists, are logically contradictory [Mackie, by PG]