67 ideas
13466 | We are all post-Kantians, because he set the current agenda for philosophy [Hart,WD] |
13477 | The problems are the monuments of philosophy [Hart,WD] |
13515 | To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD] |
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
13469 | Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD] |
13504 | Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD] |
13503 | A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD] |
13500 | Conditional Proof: infer a conditional, if the consequent can be deduced from the antecedent [Hart,WD] |
13502 | ∃y... is read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that...', and not 'There exists a y such that...' [Hart,WD] |
13456 | Set theory articulates the concept of order (through relations) [Hart,WD] |
13497 | Nowadays ZFC and NBG are the set theories; types are dead, and NF is only useful for the whole universe [Hart,WD] |
13443 | ∈ relates across layers, while ⊆ relates within layers [Hart,WD] |
13442 | Without the empty set we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet [Hart,WD] |
13493 | In the modern view, foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory [Hart,WD] |
13495 | Foundation Axiom: an nonempty set has a member disjoint from it [Hart,WD] |
13461 | We can choose from finite and evident sets, but not from infinite opaque ones [Hart,WD] |
13462 | With the Axiom of Choice every set can be well-ordered [Hart,WD] |
13516 | If we accept that V=L, it seems to settle all the open questions of set theory [Hart,WD] |
13441 | Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD] |
13494 | The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD] |
13457 | A 'partial ordering' is irreflexive and transitive; the sets are ordered, but not the subsets [Hart,WD] |
13460 | 'Well-ordering' must have a least member, so it does the natural numbers but not the integers [Hart,WD] |
13458 | A partial ordering becomes 'total' if any two members of its field are comparable [Hart,WD] |
13490 | Von Neumann defines α<β as α∈β [Hart,WD] |
13481 | Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD] |
13506 | The universal quantifier can't really mean 'all', because there is no universal set [Hart,WD] |
13505 | Model theory studies how set theory can model sets of sentences [Hart,WD] |
13511 | Model theory is mostly confined to first-order theories [Hart,WD] |
13513 | Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view [Hart,WD] |
13512 | Modern model theory begins with the proof of Los's Conjecture in 1962 [Hart,WD] |
13496 | First-order logic is 'compact': consequences of a set are consequences of a finite subset [Hart,WD] |
13484 | Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD] |
13482 | The Burali-Forti paradox is a crisis for Cantor's ordinals [Hart,WD] |
13507 | The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD] |
9117 | The smallest heap has four objects: three on the bottom, one on the top [Hart,WD, by Sorensen] |
13459 | The less-than relation < well-orders, and partially orders, and totally orders the ordinal numbers [Hart,WD] |
13463 | There are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals (because they will map) [Hart,WD] |
13491 | The axiom of infinity with separation gives a least limit ordinal ω [Hart,WD] |
13492 | Von Neumann's ordinals generalise into the transfinite better, because Zermelo's ω is a singleton [Hart,WD] |
13446 | 19th century arithmetization of analysis isolated the real numbers from geometry [Hart,WD] |
13509 | We can establish truths about infinite numbers by means of induction [Hart,WD] |
13474 | Euclid has a unique parallel, spherical geometry has none, and saddle geometry has several [Hart,WD] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
13471 | Mathematics makes existence claims, but philosophers usually say those are never analytic [Hart,WD] |
13488 | Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD] |
8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
13480 | Fregean self-evidence is an intrinsic property of basic truths, rules and definitions [Hart,WD] |
13476 | The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
13475 | The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD] |
8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |
8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
651 | Eurytus showed that numbers underlie things by making pictures of creatures out of pebbles [Eurytus, by Aristotle] |