43 ideas
12036 | Xenophanes began the concern with knowledge [Annas] |
12046 | Plato was the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas [Annas] |
5182 | Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley] |
6864 | Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley] |
18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
10999 | Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read] |
6422 | Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell] |
7966 | Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley] |
18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
6404 | British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling] |
22299 | Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter] |
21343 | Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil] |
3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
12037 | Euripides's Medea is a key case of reason versus the passions [Annas] |
5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
12040 | Virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value [Annas] |
3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |
6406 | Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley] |