115 ideas
9408 | Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford] |
9429 | Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford] |
22246 | A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati] |
16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
9427 | For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford] |
14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
9446 | Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford] |
14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
9435 | A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford] |
9447 | If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford] |
18617 | Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford] |
14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
12248 | How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford] |
16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
18618 | Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford] |
18619 | Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford] |
18620 | Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford] |
14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
6493 | We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth] |
14319 | Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford] |
14342 | General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford] |
14322 | If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford] |
14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
14324 | Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford] |
18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
22247 | Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati] |
22248 | How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati] |
16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
22242 | Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati] |
22243 | The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati] |
16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
22245 | A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati] |
16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
22250 | There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati] |
22249 | The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati] |
14344 | Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford] |
19068 | Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford] |
9430 | Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford] |
9445 | We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford] |
9443 | It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford] |
14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
9444 | There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford] |
14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
9441 | Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford] |
14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
9431 | Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford] |
9416 | Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford] |
9415 | Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford] |
9422 | If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford] |
9421 | The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford] |
9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
9434 | Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford] |
14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |
9437 | To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford] |
9439 | The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford] |
9412 | You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford] |
9411 | There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford] |