117 ideas
5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
22246 | A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati] |
16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
22247 | Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati] |
22248 | How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati] |
16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
22242 | Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati] |
22243 | The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati] |
16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
22245 | A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati] |
16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
22250 | There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati] |
22249 | The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati] |
6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |
5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |
5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |