19 ideas
18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
10414 | Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
10558 | Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta] |
10415 | Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
10557 | Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta] |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
20992 | Right and wrong concerns what other people cannot reasonably reject [Scanlon] |