Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Francesco Orsi, Edward N. Zalta and Thoralf Skolem

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
17879 Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
13536 Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
17878 If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
17880 Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
17881 Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
10414 Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer]
10558 Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
10415 Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
10557 Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]