Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Francesco Orsi, Sphaerus and Harold Hodes

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25 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10017 Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes]
10018 Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10015 Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10011 Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10016 When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
10027 Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
10026 Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10021 It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes]
10022 Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
10023 Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
20769 Sphaerus he was not assenting to the presence of pomegranates, but that it was 'reasonable' [Sphaerus, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]