39 ideas
| 14001 | People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian] |
| 13991 | Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian] |
| 13913 | The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13914 | Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13915 | Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13916 | Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13850 | In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13849 | Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13851 | Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 13852 | Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
| 16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
| 16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
| 16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
| 17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
| 16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
| 16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
| 16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
| 13074 | Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
| 22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 14002 | Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian] |
| 14000 | 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian] |
| 7563 | The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley] |
| 13990 | Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian] |
| 13992 | Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian] |
| 13994 | Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian] |
| 13995 | Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian] |
| 13996 | Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian] |
| 13997 | Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian] |
| 13993 | Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian] |
| 13998 | Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian] |
| 13999 | People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian] |
| 16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |