57 ideas
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| 16129 | Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe] |
| 16459 | Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans] |
| 16460 | Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis] |
| 16457 | There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis] |
| 16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
| 16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
| 16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
| 14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
| 17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
| 16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
| 16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
| 16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
| 13074 | Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
| 1212 | Replacing timbers on Theseus' ship was the classic illustration of the problem of growth and change [Plutarch] |
| 22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
| 14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
| 5958 | The sun is always bright; it doesn't become bright when it emerges [Plutarch] |
| 7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
| 12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
| 7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
| 5959 | Some philosophers say the soul is light [Plutarch] |
| 5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |
| 5952 | Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch] |
| 5951 | If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch] |
| 5963 | Some say emotion is a sort of reason, and others say virtue concerns emotion [Plutarch] |
| 23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
| 16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
| 12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
| 20796 | Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch] |
| 1477 | Being manly and brave is the result of convention, not of human nature [Plutarch] |
| 1478 | Animals don't value pleasure, as they cease sexual intercourse after impregnation [Plutarch] |
| 5948 | The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch] |
| 1479 | Animals have not been led into homosexuality, because they value pleasure very little [Plutarch] |
| 5950 | If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch] |
| 7563 | The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley] |
| 5974 | People report seeing through rocks, or over the horizon, or impossibly small works [Plutarch] |
| 5957 | Absurd superstitions make people atheist, not disharmony in nature [Plutarch] |
| 16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |
| 5955 | No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch] |