Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Frank Close, Stewart Cohen and Dorothy Edgington

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54 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S]
We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S]
The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S]
Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S]
Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / b. Heat
Work degrades into heat, but not vice versa [Close]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
First Law: energy can change form, but is conserved overall [Close]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Third Law: total order and minimum entropy only occurs at absolute zero [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
The electric and magnetic are tightly linked, and viewed according to your own motion [Close]
All motions are relative and ambiguous, but acceleration is the same in all inertial frames [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
The general relativity equations relate curvature in space-time to density of energy-momentum [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Electric fields have four basic laws (two by Gauss, one by Ampère, one by Faraday) [Close]
Light isn't just emitted in quanta called photons - light is photons [Close]
In general relativity the energy and momentum of photons subjects them to gravity [Close]
Electro-magnetic waves travel at light speed - so light is electromagnetism! [Close]
In QED, electro-magnetism exists in quantum states, emitting and absorbing electrons [Close]
Photon exchange drives the electro-magnetic force [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Quantum fields contain continual rapid creation and disappearance [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Dirac showed how electrons conform to special relativity [Close]
Electrons get their mass by interaction with the Higgs field [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Modern theories of matter are grounded in heat, work and energy [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / a. Electro-weak unity
The Higgs field is an electroweak plasma - but we don't know what stuff it consists of [Close]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space-time is indeterminate foam over short distances [Close]