Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Frank Close, Stewart Cohen and Joseph Melia

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43 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S]
We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S]
The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S]
Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S]
Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / b. Heat
Work degrades into heat, but not vice versa [Close]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
First Law: energy can change form, but is conserved overall [Close]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Third Law: total order and minimum entropy only occurs at absolute zero [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
All motions are relative and ambiguous, but acceleration is the same in all inertial frames [Close]
The electric and magnetic are tightly linked, and viewed according to your own motion [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
The general relativity equations relate curvature in space-time to density of energy-momentum [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Photon exchange drives the electro-magnetic force [Close]
Electric fields have four basic laws (two by Gauss, one by Ampère, one by Faraday) [Close]
Light isn't just emitted in quanta called photons - light is photons [Close]
In general relativity the energy and momentum of photons subjects them to gravity [Close]
Electro-magnetic waves travel at light speed - so light is electromagnetism! [Close]
In QED, electro-magnetism exists in quantum states, emitting and absorbing electrons [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Quantum fields contain continual rapid creation and disappearance [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons get their mass by interaction with the Higgs field [Close]
Dirac showed how electrons conform to special relativity [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Modern theories of matter are grounded in heat, work and energy [Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / a. Electro-weak unity
The Higgs field is an electroweak plasma - but we don't know what stuff it consists of [Close]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space-time is indeterminate foam over short distances [Close]