Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Friedrich Nietzsche, Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A and Bertrand Russell

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1200 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity [Nietzsche]
A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell]
Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Don't use wisdom in order to become clever! [Nietzsche]
Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche]
The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche]
But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche]
'Wisdom' attempts to get beyond perspectives, making it hostile to life [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
All intelligent Romans were Epicureans [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
I revere Heraclitus [Nietzsche]
All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Early 19th century German philosophers enjoyed concepts, rather than scientific explanations [Nietzsche]
Carlyle spent his life vainly trying to make reason appear romantic [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy begins in the horror and absurdity of existence [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned [Nietzsche]
Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche]
I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche]
A warlike philosopher challenges problems to single combat [Nietzsche]
Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche]
You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche]
What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche]
The main aim of philosophy must be to determine the order of rank among values [Nietzsche]
Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche]
Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / f. Philosophy as healing
Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche]
Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche]
Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche]
What we think is totally dictated by the language available to express it [Nietzsche]
How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems! [Nietzsche]
Words such as 'I' and 'do' and 'done to' are placed at the point where our ignorance begins [Nietzsche]
Pessimism is laughable, because the world cannot be evaluated [Nietzsche]
Is a 'philosopher' now impossible, because knowledge is too vast for an overview? [Nietzsche]
Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell]
Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance [Nietzsche]
Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
The desire for a complete system requires making the weak parts look equal to the rest [Nietzsche]
Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche]
Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche]
Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity [Nietzsche]
Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell]
Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell]
Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell]
The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell]
Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell]
Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche]
Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche]
The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell]
All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell]
'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell]
Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell]
When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell]
A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche]
Scientific knowledge is nothing without a prior philosophical 'faith' [Nietzsche]
Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell]
Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell]
Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche]
A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objectivity is not disinterestedness (impossible), but the ability to switch perspectives [Nietzsche]
Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche]
Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche]
Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche]
I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell]
The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell]
Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche]
Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
With dialectics the rabble gets on top [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell]
Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context [Russell]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric [Russell]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell]
In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Anything which must first be proved is of little value [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell]
'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless [Russell]
The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein]
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth finds fewest champions not when it is dangerous, but when it is boring [Nietzsche]
Why should truth be omnipotent? It is enough that it is very powerful [Nietzsche]
Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche]
I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche]
The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche]
Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche]
What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche]
Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche]
Psychologists should be brave and proud, and prefer truth to desires, even when it is ugly [Nietzsche]
Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche]
Truth has had to be fought for, and normal life must be sacrificed to achieve it [Nietzsche]
One must never ask whether truth is useful [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche]
Like animals, we seek truth because we want safety [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell]
What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell]
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche]
Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche]
A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell]
Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell]
Convictions, more than lies, are the great enemy of truth [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche]
True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell]
Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell]
Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell]
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche]
The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell]
More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell]
If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
"The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell]
The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null class is a fiction [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell]
We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell]
Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell]
Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell]
We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level [Russell, by Bostock]
Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell]
Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell]
Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna]
Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell]
Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell]
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche]
Logic tries to understand the world according to a man-made scheme [Nietzsche]
Logic is not driven by truth, but desire for a simple single viewpoint [Nietzsche]
Logic must falsely assume that identical cases exist [Nietzsche]
Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell]
It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell]
The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Theoretical and practical politics are both concerned with the best lives for individuals [Russell]
Classical liberalism seeks freedom of opinion, of private life, of expression, and of property [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
Implication cannot be defined [Russell]
It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell]
Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche]
The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell]
Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell]
Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock]
Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche]
Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell]
Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell]
Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan]
In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell]
Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell]
Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell]
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell]
We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell]
The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell]
Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell]
Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell]
'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell]
Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell]
A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell]
Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell]
The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell]
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell]
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach]
Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer]
"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell]
The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell]
Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell]
Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell]
The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell]
The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell]
'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell]
Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell]
Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell]
In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell]
Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG]
If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett]
Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell]
New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell]
Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell]
Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell]
Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell]
Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell]
Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell]
For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / j. Complex numbers
A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist [Nietzsche]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / b. Quantity
Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell]
Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell]
Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell]
There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell]
Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / b. Mark of the infinite
A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell]
Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell]
For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell]
Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk]
Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell]
Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell]
'0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell]
Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Numbers are properties of classes [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf]
Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell]
Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell]
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell]
In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor]
Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell]
Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave]
Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell]
Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell]
Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Numbers are just verbal conveniences, which can be analysed away [Russell]
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche]
Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell]
A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock]
Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock]
Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock]
A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell]
'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / e. Psychologism
There is always something psychological about inference [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
The 'real being' of things is a nothingness constructed from contradictions in the actual world [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
We get the concept of 'being' from the concept of the 'ego' [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche]
There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell]
'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell]
Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell]
Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell]
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
We can't be realists, because we don't know what being is [Nietzsche]
If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality [Nietzsche]
Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche]
First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell]
A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche]
There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith]
Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell]
The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Categories are not metaphysical truths, but inventions in the service of needs [Nietzsche]
Philosophers find it particularly hard to shake off belief in necessary categories [Nietzsche]
Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil]
The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell]
Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell]
There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell]
Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell]
That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell]
With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell]
'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell]
'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / b. Equivalence relation
Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell]
We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers! [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell]
Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell]
Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell]
All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell]
We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell]
Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell]
Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell]
When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell]
If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Maybe there are only subjects, and 'objects' result from relations between subjects [Nietzsche]
In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing' [Nietzsche]
Counting needs unities, but that doesn't mean they exist; we borrowed it from the concept of 'I' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche]
The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
The essence of a thing is only an opinion about the 'thing' [Nietzsche]
Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell]
It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Something can be irrefutable; that doesn't make it true [Nietzsche]
'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell]
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell]
Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche]
There are no necessary truths, but something must be held to be true [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell]
All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell]
If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche]
We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche]
Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell]
All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell]
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Most people treat knowledge as a private possession [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge! [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche]
A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind [Nietzsche]
The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche]
I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell]
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H]
There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell]
Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche]
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell]
Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell]
Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell]
As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell]
If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell]
We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche]
All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful) [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling]
'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell]
In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling]
Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell]
Sense-data are purely physical [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell]
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Pain shows the value of the damage, not what has been damaged [Nietzsche]
Perception is unconscious, and we are only conscious of processed perceptions [Nietzsche]
Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell]
Sense perceptions contain values (useful, so pleasant) [Nietzsche]
We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche]
The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson]
It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell]
We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG]
Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell]
For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche]
Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell]
I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell]
Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell]
It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell]
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche]
Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche]
Forgetfulness is a strong positive ability, not mental laziness [Nietzsche]
Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell]
It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell]
We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell]
True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell]
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche]
We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche]
The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche]
We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche]
Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche]
There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view [Nietzsche]
The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin]
It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche]
Comprehending everything is impossible, because it abolishes perspectives [Nietzsche]
Is the perspectival part of the essence, or just a relation between beings? [Nietzsche]
'Perspectivism': the world has no meaning, but various interpretations give it countless meanings [Nietzsche]
'Subjectivity' is an interpretation, since subjects (and interpreters) are fictions [Nietzsche]
There are different eyes, so different 'truths', so there is no truth [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions [Nietzsche]
Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell]
Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell]
It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is just showing the succession of things ever more clearly [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell]
Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
Any explanation will be accepted as true if it gives pleasure and a feeling of power [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche]
The intellect and senses are a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell]
Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche]
With protoplasm ½+½=2, so the soul is not an indivisible monad [Nietzsche]
Unity is not in the conscious 'I', but in the organism, which uses the self as a tool [Nietzsche]
It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche]
Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche]
Consciousness exists to the extent that consciousness is useful [Nietzsche]
Consciousness is a 'tool' - just as the stomach is a tool [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche]
Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche]
Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche]
Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Leaves are unequal, but we form the concept 'leaf' by discarding their individual differences [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The 'highest' concepts are the most general and empty concepts [Nietzsche]
It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
We can cultivate our drives, of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity, like a gardener, with good or bad taste [Nietzsche]
The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche]
The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche]
Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge [Nietzsche]
Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete [Nietzsche]
Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell]
'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche]
A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche]
We think each thought causes the next, unaware of the hidden struggle beneath [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
There are no 'individual' persons; we are each the sum of humanity up to this moment [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche]
The 'I' is a conceptual synthesis, not the governor of our being [Nietzsche]
The 'I' is a fiction used to make the world of becoming 'knowable' [Nietzsche]
Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche]
In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche]
'Freedom of will' is the feeling of having a dominating force [Nietzsche]
Philosophers invented "free will" so that our virtues would be permanently interesting to the gods [Nietzsche]
A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People used to think that outcomes were from God, rather than consequences of acts [Nietzsche]
That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche]
Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche]
People who think in words are orators rather than thinkers, and think about facts instead of thinking facts [Nietzsche]
Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality is a scheme we cannot cast away [Nietzsche]
Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche]
It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
The fanatical rationality of Greek philosophy shows that they were in a state of emergency [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell]
Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell]
To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell]
In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell]
The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche]
Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche]
A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche]
Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell]
The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell]
A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD]
Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell]
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell]
Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche]
Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell]
If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell]
Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell]
Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
It is essential that wise people learn to express their wisdom, possibly even as foolishness [Nietzsche]
Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot]
It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche]
Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche]
The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word [Nietzsche]
The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche]
There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
People always do what they think is right, according to the degree of their intellect [Nietzsche]
Our judgment seems to cause our nature, but actually judgment arises from our nature [Nietzsche]
The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed [Nietzsche]
A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Actions done for a purpose are least understood, because we complacently think it's obvious [Nietzsche]
Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Experiencing a thing as beautiful is to experience it wrongly [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Why are the strong tastes of other people so contagious? [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty in art is the imitation of happiness [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
The beautiful never stands alone; it derives from man's pleasure in man [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche]
The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Artists are not especially passionate, but they pretend to be [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Without music life would be a mistake [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality is a system of values which accompanies a being's life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
The very idea of a critique of morality is regarded as immoral! [Nietzsche]
I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Morality is merely interpretations, which are extra-moral in origin [Nietzsche]
Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche]
There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche]
Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot]
None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche]
The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people [Nietzsche]
It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Morality prevents us from developing better customs [Nietzsche]
We must question the very value of moral values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche]
Philosophy grasps the limits of human reason, and values are beyond it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche]
'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik]
Values are innate and inherited [Nietzsche]
Our values express an earlier era's conditions for survival and growth [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche]
Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche]
Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche]
Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot]
We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche]
Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche]
Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche]
The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche]
The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche]
Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche]
Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche]
Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche]
The concept of 'good' was created by aristocrats to describe their own actions [Nietzsche]
A strong rounded person soon forgets enemies, misfortunes, and even misdeeds [Nietzsche]
There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche]
The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche]
The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche]
Christianity is at war with the higher type of man, and excommunicates his basic instincts [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche]
The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
All animals strive for the ideal conditions to express their power, and hate any hindrances [Nietzsche]
There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche]
The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche]
Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche]
'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot]
That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche]
All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche]
The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
Knowledge, wisdom and goodness only have value relative to a goal [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims [Nietzsche]
A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche]
In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche]
The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche]
When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche]
Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche]
To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most dying people have probably lost more important things than what they are about to lose [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche]
Altruism is praised by the egoism of the weak, who want everyone to be looked after [Nietzsche]
How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We only really love children and work [Nietzsche]
Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche]
Marriage is too serious to be permitted for people in love! [Nietzsche]
If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche]
Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche]
Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality [Nietzsche]
Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell]
Marriage upholds the idea that love, though a passion, can endure [Nietzsche]
Fear reveals the natures of other people much more clearly than love does [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
A living being is totally 'egoistic' [Nietzsche]
Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
The distinction between egoistic and non-egoistic acts is absurd [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche]
In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche]
Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Punishment has distorted the pure innocence of the contingency of outcomes [Nietzsche]
A bad result distorts one's judgement about the virtue of what one has done [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Modest people express happiness as 'Not bad' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Only the English actually strive after happiness [Nietzsche]
I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche]
It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche]
We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche]
A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell]
We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche]
The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche]
In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell]
The only happiness is happiness with illusion [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure needs dissatisfaction, boundaries and resistances [Nietzsche]
Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing [Nietzsche]
The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche rejects impersonal morality, and asserts the idea of living well [Nietzsche, by Nagel]
People do nothing for their real ego, but only for a phantom ego created by other people [Nietzsche]
Only the decline of aristocratic morality led to concerns about "egoism" [Nietzsche]
The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche]
Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Basic justice is the negotiation of agreement among equals, and the imposition of agreement [Nietzsche]
A masterful and violent person need have nothing to do with contracts [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche]
If you feel to others as they feel to themselves, you must hate a self-hater [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
First morality is force, then custom, then acceptance, then instinct, then a pleasure - and finally 'virtue' [Nietzsche]
Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche]
Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot]
Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche]
No two actions are the same [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche]
Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche]
After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot]
Virtue is wasteful, as it reduces us all to being one another's nurse [Nietzsche]
Virtue for everyone removes its charm of being exceptional and aristocratic [Nietzsche]
Virtues must be highly personal; if not, it is merely respect for a concept [Nietzsche]
Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche]
'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche]
Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The 'good' man does the moral thing as if by nature, easily and gladly, after a long inheritance [Nietzsche]
We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche]
Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
What does not kill us makes us stronger [Nietzsche]
We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Honesty is a new young virtue, and we can promote it, or not [Nietzsche]
The Jews treated great anger as holy, and were in awe of those who expressed it [Nietzsche]
Christianity replaces rational philosophical virtues with great passions focused on God [Nietzsche]
The cardinal virtues want us to be honest, brave, magnanimous and polite [Nietzsche]
The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche]
Courage, compassion, insight, solitude are the virtues, with courtesy a necessary vice [Nietzsche]
A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche]
Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche]
Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche]
All societies of good men give a priority to gratitude [Nietzsche]
Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice (fairness) originates among roughly equal powers (as the Melian dialogues show) [Nietzsche]
When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Military idea: what does not kill me makes me stronger [Nietzsche]
Cool courage and feverish bravery have one name, but are two very different virtues [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche]
Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche]
Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche]
You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche]
Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity [Nietzsche]
Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche]
The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Teach youth to respect people who differ with them, not people who agree with them [Nietzsche]
Individuals need creativity, reverence for others, and self-respect [Russell]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Many people are better at having good friends than being a good friend [Nietzsche]
Women can be friends with men, but only some physical antipathy will maintain it [Nietzsche]
If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Each person should devise his own virtues and categorical imperative [Nietzsche]
Replace the categorical imperative by the natural imperative [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Seeing duty as a burden makes it a bit cruel, and it can thus never become a habit [Nietzsche]
Guilt and obligation originated in the relationship of buying and selling, credit and debt [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche]
Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell]
The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche]
The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
In Homer it is the contemptible person, not the harmful person, who is bad [Nietzsche]
Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche]
Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski on Nietzsche]
Not feeling harnessed to a system of 'ends' is a wonderful feeling of freedom [Nietzsche]
If we say birds of prey could become lambs, that makes them responsible for being birds of prey [Nietzsche]
If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche]
The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche]
The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche]
We could live more naturally, relishing the spectacle, and not thinking we are special [Nietzsche]
We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche]
My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche]
The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche]
Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
Modern nihilism is now feeling tired of mankind [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Nietzsche, by Zizek]
For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche]
Nihilism results from measuring the world by our categories which are purely invented [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche]
The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche]
Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell]
Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell]
People do not experience boredom if they have never learned to work properly [Nietzsche]
Flight from boredom leads to art [Nietzsche]
Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell]
Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
It is absurd to think you can change your own essence, like a garment [Nietzsche]
Over huge periods of time human character would change endlessly [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
To become what you are you must have no self-awareness [Nietzsche]
By developing herd virtues man fixes what has up to now been the 'unfixed animal' [Nietzsche]
Virtues from outside are dangerous, and they should come from within [Nietzsche]
Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche]
Most people think they are already complete, but we can cultivate ourselves [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche]
The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Nietzsche, by Safranski]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche]
The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche]
Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche]
If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche]
Reliving life countless times - this gives the value back to life which religion took away [Nietzsche]
The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche]
Existence without meaning or goal or end, eternally recurring, is a terrible thought [Nietzsche]
Eternal recurrence is the highest attainable affirmation [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is above all a judging animal [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell]
Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell]
In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell]
An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche]
Old tribes always felt an obligation to the earlier generations, and the founders [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The state aims to protect individuals from one another [Nietzsche]
Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary [Nietzsche]
The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche]
Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
The state begins with brutal conquest of a disorganised people, not with a 'contract' [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche]
Culture cannot do without passions and vices [Nietzsche]
Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
No authority ever willingly accepts criticism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche]
A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche]
The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People govern for the pleasure of it, or just to avoid being governed [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
The upholding of the military state is needed to maintain the strong human type [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / b. Devolution
Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell]
We would not want UK affairs to be settled by a world parliament [Russell]
Democracy is inadequate without a great deal of devolution [Russell]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
The French Revolution gave trusting Europe the false delusion of instant recovery [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Anarchy does not maximise liberty [Russell]
In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell]
A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If we want the good life for the greatest number, we must let them decide on the good life [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
Groups should be autonomous, with a neutral authority as arbitrator [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
On every new question the majority is always wrong at first [Russell]
Democracy is organisational power in decline [Nietzsche]
Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche]
In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell]
Democratic institutions become impossible in a fanatical democracy [Russell]
Unfortunately ordinary voters can't detect insincerity [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberal opinions are tentative rather than dogmatic, and are always responsive to new evidence [Russell]
Empiricist Liberalism is the only view for someone who favours scientific evidence and happiness [Russell]
Empiricism is ethically superior, because dogmatism favours persecution and hatred [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
The creation of institutions needs a determination which is necessarily anti-liberal [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
When the state is the only employer, there is no refuge from the prejudices of other people [Russell]
Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell]
Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell]
The welfare state aims at freedom from want, and equality of opportunity [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
For communists history is driven by the proletariat [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Fans of economic freedom claim that capitalism is self-correcting [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
Men unite in pursuit of material things, and idealise greed as part of group loyalty [Russell]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery cannot be judged by our standards, because the sense of justice was then less developed [Nietzsche]
There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche]
Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche]
We need security and liberty, and then encouragement of creativity [Russell]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell]
Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights arise out of contracts, which need a balance of power [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
The right to own land gives a legal right to a permanent income [Russell]
To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche]
Roman law entrenched property rights [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
True justice is equality for equals and inequality for unequals [Nietzsche]
Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Laws that are well thought out, or laws that are easy to understand? [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty [Nietzsche]
Get rid of the idea of punishment! It is a noxious weed! [Nietzsche]
Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche]
Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Punishment makes people harder, more alienated, and hostile [Nietzsche]
Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
People will enthusiastically pursue an unwanted war, once sacrifices have been made [Nietzsche]
To renounce war is to renounce the grand life [Nietzsche]
Modern wars arise from the study of history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Don't crush girls with dull Gymnasium education, the way we have crushed boys! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Education in large states is mediocre, like cooking in large kitchens [Nietzsche]
Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche]
Interest in education gains strength when we lose interest in God [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Teachers only gather knowledge for their pupils, and can't be serious about themselves [Nietzsche]
There is a need for educators who are themselves educated [Nietzsche]
One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche]
History does not concern what really happened, but supposed events, which have all the influence [Nietzsche]
Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche]
After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Sometimes it is an error to have been born - but we can rectify it [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The end need not be the goal, as in the playing of a melody (and yet it must be completed) [Nietzsche]
'Purpose' is like the sun, where most heat is wasted, and a tiny part has 'purpose' [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
If the world aimed at an end, it would have reached it by now [Nietzsche]
'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche]
Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche]
We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell]
Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell]
The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell]
If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell]
In religious thought nature is a complex of arbitrary acts by conscious beings [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Things are strong or weak, and do not behave regularly or according to rules or compulsions [Nietzsche]
Chemical 'laws' are merely the establishment of power relations between weaker and stronger [Nietzsche]
All motions and 'laws' are symptoms of inner events, traceable to the will to power [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche]
Modern man wants laws of nature in order to submit to them [Nietzsche]
The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell]
We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell]
Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
Matter is a logical construction [Russell]
Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell]
At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche]
There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]
Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Enquirers think finding our origin is salvation, but it turns out to be dull [Nietzsche]
Survival might undermine an individual's value, or prevent its evolution [Nietzsche]
A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche]
Darwin overestimates the influence of 'external circumstances' [Nietzsche]
The utility of an organ does not explain its origin, on the contrary! [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche]
Remove goodness and wisdom from our concept of God. Being the highest power is enough! [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
A God who cures us of a head cold at the right moment is a total absurdity [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche]
Morality kills religion, because a Christian-moral God is unbelievable [Nietzsche]
It is dishonest to invent a being containing our greatest values, thus ignoring why they exist and are valuable [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
If God's decrees are good, and this is not a mere tautology, then goodness is separate from God's decrees [Russell]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Morality can only be upheld by belief in God and a 'hereafter' [Nietzsche]
Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The supreme general but empty concepts must be compatible, and hence we get 'God' [Nietzsche]
The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell]
You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche]
Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods! [Nietzsche]
I am not an atheist because of reasoning or evidence, but because of instinct [Nietzsche]
By denying God we deny human accountability, and thus we redeem the world [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche]
Paganism is a form of thanking and affirming life? [Nietzsche]
The Greeks saw the gods not as their masters, but as idealised versions of themselves [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christians believe that only God can know what is good for man [Nietzsche]
Science rejecting the teaching of Christianity in favour of Epicurus shows the superiority of the latter [Nietzsche]
The Sermon on the Mount is vanity - praying to one part of oneself, and demonising the rest [Nietzsche]
Christ was the noblest human being [Nietzsche]
Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche]
Christ seems warm hearted, and suppressed intellect in favour of the intellectually weak [Nietzsche]
Christianity hoped for a short cut to perfection, that skipped the hard labour of morality [Nietzsche]
Christianity was successful because of its heathen rituals [Nietzsche]
Christian belief is kept alive because it is soothing - the proof based on pleasure [Nietzsche]
Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche]
How could the Church intelligently fight against passion if it preferred poorness of spirit to intelligence? [Nietzsche]
Christianity is a revolt of things crawling on the ground against elevated things [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The story in Genesis is the story of God's fear of science [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is tempting if your life is boring, but you can't therefore impose it on the busy people [Nietzsche]
The truly great haters in world history have always been priests [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
'I believe because it is absurd' - but how about 'I believe because I am absurd' [Nietzsche]
'Faith' means not wanting to know what is true [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The great lie of immortality destroys rationality and natural instinct [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The easy and graceful aspects of a person are called 'soul', and inner awkwardness is called 'soulless' [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
In heaven all the interesting men are missing [Nietzsche]
That our heaven is a dull place reflects the misery of excessive work in life [Russell]
Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche]
People who disparage actual life avenge themselves by imagining a better one [Nietzsche]
We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
A combination of great power and goodness would mean the disastrous abolition of evil [Nietzsche]