Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for G.E. Moore, Anon (Ecc) and John Dupr

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45 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
In much wisdom is much grief [Anon (Ecc)]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Sorrow is better than laughter [Anon (Ecc)]
Laughter is mad; of mirth, what doeth it? [Anon (Ecc)]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
All is vanity, saith the Preacher [Anon (Ecc)]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Books are endless, and study is wearisome [Anon (Ecc)]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]
Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]