65 ideas
| 6405 | Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling] |
| 17992 | The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE] |
| 10468 | A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver] |
| 7527 | Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
| 10471 | Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver] |
| 10749 | Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
| 10750 | Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
| 11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
| 11989 | For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan] |
| 10747 | Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver] |
| 10748 | Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver] |
| 21342 | A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil] |
| 10721 | If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver] |
| 10719 | There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver] |
| 10716 | There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver] |
| 10720 | We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver] |
| 10714 | The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver] |
| 10715 | There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver] |
| 10739 | The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver] |
| 10738 | Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver] |
| 10740 | The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver] |
| 10741 | Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver] |
| 10742 | Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver] |
| 10472 | 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver] |
| 10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver] |
| 10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver] |
| 7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver] |
| 7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
| 10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
| 10722 | Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver] |
| 10744 | Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver] |
| 10726 | Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver] |
| 10725 | Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver] |
| 11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
| 10745 | Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver] |
| 11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
| 11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
| 11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
| 11990 | 'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan] |
| 9668 | 'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan] |
| 11991 | If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan] |
| 6672 | Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe] |
| 20147 | Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE] |
| 6349 | I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE] |
| 10746 | Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver] |
| 11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
| 14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
| 14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
| 22302 | Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter] |
| 7526 | Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
| 21233 | The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE] |
| 8039 | Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
| 11056 | The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE] |
| 22151 | The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE] |
| 8033 | Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
| 8032 | Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
| 11050 | Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE] |
| 23726 | Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M] |
| 18676 | We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE] |
| 11057 | It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE] |
| 5925 | The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross] |
| 5902 | For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross] |
| 5903 | 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE] |
| 5907 | Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE] |