Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for G.E. Moore, Terence Horgan and Diogenes (Apoll)

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
1542 Diogenes of Apollonia was the last natural scientist [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Simplicius]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
6405 Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
17992 The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
7527 Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
16052 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T]
16053 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16056 Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16054 Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T]
16055 Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
21342 A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
489 Each thing must be in some way unique [Diogenes of Apollonia]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6672 Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
20147 Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
6349 I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
483 Start a thesis with something undisputable [Diogenes of Apollonia]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
1544 Perception must be an internal matter, because we can fail to perceive when we are preoccupied [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Theophrastus]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
16057 Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
24042 The older Diogenes said the soul is air, made of the smallest particles [Diogenes of Apollonia]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
22302 Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
7526 Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
5995 Diogenes of Apollonia offered the first teleological account of cosmology [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Robinson,TM]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
484 Everything is ultimately a variation of one underlying thing [Diogenes of Apollonia]
488 Air is divine, because it is in and around everything, and arranges everything [Diogenes of Apollonia]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
486 Plants and animals can only come into existence if something fixes their species [Diogenes of Apollonia]
485 Things must retain their essential nature during change, or mixing would be impossible [Diogenes of Apollonia]