42 ideas
| 3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
| 3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
| 10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
| 10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
| 10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
| 10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
| 10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
| 10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
| 10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
| 10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
| 10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
| 10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
| 10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
| 10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
| 10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
| 10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
| 10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
| 10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
| 10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
| 10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
| 3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
| 3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
| 3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
| 5673 | If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam] |
| 5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |
| 5671 | Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| 5672 | Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam] |
| 5675 | Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| 5674 | We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam] |
| 3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
| 3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
| 3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
| 3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
| 3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
| 3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
| 3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
| 3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
| 3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
| 3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
| 3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
| 3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
| 3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |