38 ideas
23269 | Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen] |
6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
23248 | Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M] |
8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |
23266 | The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen] |
6003 | Galen showed by experiment that the brain controls the body [Galen, by Hankinson] |
23219 | Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb] |
21799 | We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen] |
23264 | Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen] |
23220 | The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen] |
23265 | The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen] |
6248 | Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson] |
6238 | We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson] |
6239 | We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson] |
6240 | The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson] |
6242 | We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson] |
6247 | Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson] |
6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
6244 | Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson] |
6243 | As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson] |
6246 | My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson] |
6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
7453 | Galen's medicine followed the mean; each illness was balanced by opposite treatment [Galen, by Hacking] |
6030 | Each part of the soul has its virtue - pleasure for appetite, success for competition, and rectitude for reason [Galen] |
6241 | Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson] |
6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
6245 | That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson] |
6251 | The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson] |
23268 | We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen] |
6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |
6250 | We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson] |
6249 | If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson] |