39 ideas
23269 | Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen] |
23248 | Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M] |
9065 | S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith] |
8439 | Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett] |
8440 | Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
9064 | Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith] |
9044 | If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith] |
9048 | The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith] |
9055 | The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith] |
9049 | Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith] |
9056 | Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith] |
9058 | Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith] |
9059 | The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith] |
9060 | Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith] |
9050 | A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith] |
9061 | People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith] |
9062 | If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith] |
9063 | How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith] |
9045 | Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith] |
9047 | Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith] |
9053 | If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith] |
23266 | The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen] |
6003 | Galen showed by experiment that the brain controls the body [Galen, by Hankinson] |
23219 | Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb] |
21799 | We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen] |
23264 | Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen] |
23220 | The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen] |
23265 | The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen] |
7453 | Galen's medicine followed the mean; each illness was balanced by opposite treatment [Galen, by Hacking] |
6030 | Each part of the soul has its virtue - pleasure for appetite, success for competition, and rectitude for reason [Galen] |
23268 | We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen] |
8441 | Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett] |
8436 | Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett] |
8435 | Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
8437 | The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett] |
8438 | A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett] |
8592 | Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker] |