804 ideas
| 21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| 11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
| 11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
| 11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
| 11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
| 11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
| 11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
| 11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
| 11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
| 11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
| 11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
| 11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
| 11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
| 11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
| 11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
| 11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
| 11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
| 11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
| 11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
| 11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
| 11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
| 11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
| 11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
| 11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
| 11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
| 11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
| 11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
| 11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
| 11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
| 11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
| 11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
| 11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
| 11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
| 11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
| 11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
| 11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
| 11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
| 11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
| 11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
| 11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
| 11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
| 11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
| 11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
| 11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
| 11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
| 11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
| 11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
| 11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| 11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
| 11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
| 11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
| 17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
| 11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
| 11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
| 11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
| 11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
| 11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
| 11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
| 11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
| 11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
| 11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
| 11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
| 11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
| 11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
| 11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
| 11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
| 11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| 11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
| 11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
| 11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
| 11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
| 11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
| 11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
| 11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
| 11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
| 11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
| 11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
| 11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
| 11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
| 11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
| 11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
| 11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
| 11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
| 11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
| 11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
| 17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
| 17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
| 17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
| 11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
| 17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
| 11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
| 11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
| 11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
| 17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
| 17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
| 11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
| 17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
| 11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
| 11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
| 11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
| 17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
| 11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
| 11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
| 11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
| 17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
| 11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| 11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
| 11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
| 11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
| 11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
| 11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
| 11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
| 11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
| 11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
| 11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
| 17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
| 11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| 5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
| 5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
| 23269 | Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen] |
| 23025 | Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell] |
| 17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
| 21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
| 5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
| 21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
| 21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
| 21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
| 21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
| 6095 | The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell] |
| 14122 | Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell] |
| 6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
| 6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
| 6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
| 4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
| 7529 | All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell] |
| 14109 | The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell] |
| 14456 | 'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell] |
| 21552 | Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell] |
| 21546 | We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell] |
| 21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
| 6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
| 14165 | Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell] |
| 8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
| 5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
| 6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
| 17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
| 23248 | Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M] |
| 5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
| 5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
| 17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
| 6106 | Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell] |
| 14426 | A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell] |
| 21560 | Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context [Russell] |
| 21551 | Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric [Russell] |
| 14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
| 14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
| 4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
| 14148 | Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell] |
| 7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
| 7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
| 6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
| 18002 | As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell] |
| 21561 | 'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless [Russell] |
| 8468 | The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein] |
| 6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
| 5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
| 14102 | What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell] |
| 5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
| 6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
| 5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
| 5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
| 16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
| 5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
| 6090 | Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell] |
| 21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
| 18348 | Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami] |
| 6343 | For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell] |
| 7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
| 5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
| 5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
| 5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
| 5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
| 5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
| 5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
| 14454 | An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell] |
| 14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
| 4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
| 5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
| 14453 | The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell] |
| 16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
| 14113 | The null class is a fiction [Russell] |
| 6103 | Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell] |
| 14427 | We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell] |
| 14428 | Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell] |
| 14440 | We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell] |
| 14447 | Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell] |
| 14443 | The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell] |
| 14445 | Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell] |
| 14444 | Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell] |
| 14446 | We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell] |
| 18130 | Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 14459 | Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell] |
| 21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
| 14461 | Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell] |
| 15894 | Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine] |
| 14126 | Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell] |
| 14127 | Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell] |
| 8469 | Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein] |
| 11064 | Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna] |
| 7548 | Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell] |
| 8745 | Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell] |
| 6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
| 14121 | The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell] |
| 6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
| 21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
| 6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
| 14452 | All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell] |
| 16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
| 21495 | Theoretical and practical politics are both concerned with the best lives for individuals [Russell] |
| 14462 | In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell] |
| 5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
| 14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
| 14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
| 14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
| 14464 | Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell] |
| 22329 | Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock] |
| 12444 | Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell] |
| 10057 | Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell] |
| 10053 | Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell] |
| 21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 6092 | In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell] |
| 6101 | Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell] |
| 6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
| 7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
| 23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
| 23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
| 21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
| 21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
| 14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
| 18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
| 16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
| 16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
| 16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
| 16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
| 16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
| 16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
| 14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
| 14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| 21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
| 6102 | You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell] |
| 10423 | There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| 5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
| 7744 | Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 10450 | Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach] |
| 14458 | Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell] |
| 14457 | Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| 6410 | The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| 14455 | 'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell] |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| 5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| 14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| 18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
| 17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
| 17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
| 17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
| 6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
| 6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
| 7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
| 14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
| 21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
| 21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
| 15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
| 13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
| 10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
| 6407 | The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
| 21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
| 16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
| 10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
| 14151 | Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell] |
| 14152 | In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell] |
| 14154 | Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell] |
| 14153 | In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell] |
| 14155 | Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG] |
| 14442 | If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell] |
| 18254 | Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett] |
| 14144 | Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell] |
| 14438 | New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell] |
| 14128 | Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell] |
| 14129 | Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell] |
| 14132 | Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell] |
| 13510 | Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
| 14139 | Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell] |
| 14142 | Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell] |
| 14141 | Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell] |
| 14145 | For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell] |
| 14146 | We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell] |
| 14135 | Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell] |
| 14436 | A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell] |
| 14439 | A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell] |
| 14421 | Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell] |
| 14123 | Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell] |
| 14158 | Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell] |
| 14120 | Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell] |
| 14424 | Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell] |
| 14118 | We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell] |
| 14441 | The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell] |
| 14133 | There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell] |
| 14119 | We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell] |
| 14420 | Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell] |
| 14134 | Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell] |
| 7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
| 14143 | ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell] |
| 14138 | You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell] |
| 14140 | For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell] |
| 17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
| 10052 | Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave] |
| 14124 | Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell] |
| 14431 | The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell] |
| 14423 | '0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell] |
| 7530 | Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk] |
| 18246 | Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell] |
| 14422 | Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell] |
| 14125 | Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell] |
| 14147 | Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell] |
| 14116 | Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell] |
| 14117 | Numbers are properties of classes [Russell] |
| 14425 | A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell] |
| 14434 | What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell] |
| 9977 | Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell] |
| 14162 | Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell] |
| 17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
| 5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
| 14465 | Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell] |
| 14103 | Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell] |
| 13414 | For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf] |
| 6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
| 6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
| 21555 | For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell] |
| 18003 | In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor] |
| 10418 | Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell] |
| 10047 | Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave] |
| 23478 | Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell] |
| 23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
| 21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 21718 | Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 21570 | Numbers are just verbal conveniences, which can be analysed away [Russell] |
| 6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
| 6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
| 6104 | Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell] |
| 6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
| 21559 | We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell] |
| 21558 | 'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell] |
| 18126 | A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 18128 | Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 18124 | Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock] |
| 21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
| 14449 | There is always something psychological about inference [Russell] |
| 14463 | Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell] |
| 11010 | Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell] |
| 14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
| 14173 | What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell] |
| 6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 16045 | General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K] |
| 10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
| 21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
| 21708 | Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 19051 | Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine] |
| 6089 | Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell] |
| 6100 | Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell] |
| 6105 | Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell] |
| 6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
| 6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
| 21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
| 21681 | Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell] |
| 6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
| 6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
| 6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
| 21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
| 5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
| 7545 | Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell] |
| 14429 | Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell] |
| 21709 | You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell] |
| 6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
| 6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
| 18376 | Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong] |
| 5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
| 22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
| 22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
| 5465 | Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis] |
| 9051 | Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith] |
| 9054 | Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell] |
| 6060 | 'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell] |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| 14163 | Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell] |
| 21341 | Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil] |
| 21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
| 21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
| 21562 | There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell] |
| 5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
| 5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
| 21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
| 14430 | If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell] |
| 10586 | 'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell] |
| 14432 | 'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell] |
| 10585 | Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell] |
| 9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
| 21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| 14327 | Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford] |
| 5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
| 4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
| 5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
| 4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
| 21710 | We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell] |
| 4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
| 5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
| 5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
| 4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
| 6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
| 4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
| 6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
| 14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
| 7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
| 21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
| 21531 | Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell] |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| 21545 | I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell] |
| 21547 | On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell] |
| 14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
| 21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
| 14164 | The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell] |
| 14112 | A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell] |
| 6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
| 6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
| 14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 14435 | The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 14170 | Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell] |
| 14107 | Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell] |
| 11849 | It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
| 8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
| 6099 | Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell] |
| 16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
| 22308 | Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell] |
| 21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
| 24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
| 12197 | Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell] |
| 14450 | All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell] |
| 22303 | It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell] |
| 14460 | If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell] |
| 5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
| 5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
| 16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
| 6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
| 5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
| 5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
| 5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
| 17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
| 5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
| 4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
| 3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
| 21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
| 5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
| 6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
| 21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
| 6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
| 6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
| 5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
| 7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
| 5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
| 5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
| 5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
| 5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
| 5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
| 3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
| 4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
| 5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
| 6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
| 6417 | In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 6474 | Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell] |
| 6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
| 6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
| 6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
| 7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
| 7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
| 6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
| 6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
| 6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
| 6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
| 21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
| 8854 | My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell] |
| 6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
| 6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
| 6476 | We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell] |
| 6098 | Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell] |
| 21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
| 7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
| 5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
| 5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
| 5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
| 16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
| 6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
| 16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
| 6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
| 21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
| 5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
| 16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
| 5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
| 2792 | It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell] |
| 5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
| 5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
| 6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
| 5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
| 21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
| 22326 | Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell] |
| 5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
| 21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
| 14433 | Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell] |
| 5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
| 17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
| 5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
| 5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
| 5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
| 5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
| 5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
| 23266 | The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen] |
| 6003 | Galen showed by experiment that the brain controls the body [Galen, by Hankinson] |
| 5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
| 6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
| 23219 | Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb] |
| 21799 | We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen] |
| 23264 | Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen] |
| 21569 | It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell] |
| 5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
| 5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
| 5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
| 7546 | A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell] |
| 6475 | In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell] |
| 5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
| 6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
| 5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
| 23220 | The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen] |
| 7550 | We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell] |
| 7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
| 7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
| 23265 | The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen] |
| 5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
| 5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
| 21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
| 21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
| 22306 | To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell] |
| 5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
| 6097 | The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell] |
| 6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
| 21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
| 7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
| 5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
| 10583 | Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell] |
| 10582 | The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell] |
| 10584 | A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell] |
| 6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
| 13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
| 5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
| 6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| 9022 | Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell] |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21550 | Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell] |
| 14110 | Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell] |
| 21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
| 6091 | Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell] |
| 5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
| 5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
| 5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
| 14451 | Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell] |
| 19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 21702 | In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine] |
| 6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
| 22307 | Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell] |
| 19157 | Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson] |
| 14111 | A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell] |
| 7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
| 21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
| 6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
| 21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
| 16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
| 6093 | The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell] |
| 16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
| 21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
| 23154 | We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell] |
| 21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
| 21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
| 21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
| 21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
| 20180 | A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell] |
| 21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
| 7453 | Galen's medicine followed the mean; each illness was balanced by opposite treatment [Galen, by Hacking] |
| 6030 | Each part of the soul has its virtue - pleasure for appetite, success for competition, and rectitude for reason [Galen] |
| 21517 | Individuals need creativity, reverence for others, and self-respect [Russell] |
| 21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
| 5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
| 3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
| 20179 | Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell] |
| 20177 | Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell] |
| 20178 | Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell] |
| 20176 | Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell] |
| 23153 | Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell] |
| 23152 | Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell] |
| 23155 | In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell] |
| 23156 | The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell] |
| 23157 | Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell] |
| 23151 | A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell] |
| 21522 | Democracy is inadequate without a great deal of devolution [Russell] |
| 21523 | We would not want UK affairs to be settled by a world parliament [Russell] |
| 23167 | Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell] |
| 23168 | A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell] |
| 21521 | Anarchy does not maximise liberty [Russell] |
| 23163 | In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell] |
| 21528 | Groups should be autonomous, with a neutral authority as arbitrator [Russell] |
| 21526 | Unfortunately ordinary voters can't detect insincerity [Russell] |
| 23166 | In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell] |
| 23169 | Democratic institutions become impossible in a fanatical democracy [Russell] |
| 21527 | On every new question the majority is always wrong at first [Russell] |
| 23170 | Liberal opinions are tentative rather than dogmatic, and are always responsive to new evidence [Russell] |
| 23171 | Empiricism is ethically superior, because dogmatism favours persecution and hatred [Russell] |
| 23172 | Empiricist Liberalism is the only view for someone who favours scientific evidence and happiness [Russell] |
| 23162 | Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell] |
| 23165 | Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell] |
| 23160 | Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell] |
| 21525 | When the state is the only employer, there is no refuge from the prejudices of other people [Russell] |
| 21518 | Men unite in pursuit of material things, and idealise greed as part of group loyalty [Russell] |
| 23158 | Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell] |
| 21519 | We need security and liberty, and then encouragement of creativity [Russell] |
| 23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
| 23159 | Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell] |
| 21524 | The right to own land gives a legal right to a permanent income [Russell] |
| 23164 | Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell] |
| 23268 | We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen] |
| 21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
| 14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
| 14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
| 4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
| 8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
| 8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
| 17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |
| 8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
| 8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |
| 14174 | The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell] |
| 5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |
| 14168 | Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell] |
| 4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |
| 14171 | Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell] |
| 7547 | Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell] |
| 7551 | Matter is a logical construction [Russell] |
| 21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
| 6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
| 7552 | Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell] |
| 14160 | Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell] |
| 21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |
| 14156 | Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell] |
| 22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |
| 14169 | The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell] |
| 6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
| 3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
| 3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
| 2609 | If God's decrees are good, and this is not a mere tautology, then goodness is separate from God's decrees [Russell] |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |
| 6119 | You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell] |
| 21520 | That our heaven is a dull place reflects the misery of excessive work in life [Russell] |