Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Galen, Protagoras and Michle Friend

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70 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
An 'impredicative' definition seems circular, because it uses the term being defined [Friend]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
Classical definitions attempt to refer, but intuitionist/constructivist definitions actually create objects [Friend]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 5. Reductio ad Absurdum
Reductio ad absurdum proves an idea by showing that its denial produces contradiction [Friend]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Anti-realists see truth as our servant, and epistemically contrained [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
In classical/realist logic the connectives are defined by truth-tables [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Double negation elimination is not valid in intuitionist logic [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic was developed for fictional or non-existent objects [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A 'proper subset' of A contains only members of A, but not all of them [Friend]
A 'powerset' is all the subsets of a set [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Set theory makes a minimum ontological claim, that the empty set exists [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Infinite sets correspond one-to-one with a subset [Friend]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Major set theories differ in their axioms, and also over the additional axioms of choice and infinity [Friend]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The law of excluded middle is syntactic; it just says A or not-A, not whether they are true or false [Friend]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Intuitionists read the universal quantifier as "we have a procedure for checking every..." [Friend]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
Paradoxes can be solved by talking more loosely of 'classes' instead of 'sets' [Friend]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
The Burali-Forti paradox asks whether the set of all ordinals is itself an ordinal [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
No perceptible object is truly straight or curved [Protagoras]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
The 'integers' are the positive and negative natural numbers, plus zero [Friend]
The 'rational' numbers are those representable as fractions [Friend]
A number is 'irrational' if it cannot be represented as a fraction [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
The natural numbers are primitive, and the ordinals are up one level of abstraction [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
Cardinal numbers answer 'how many?', with the order being irrelevant [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The 'real' numbers (rationals and irrationals combined) is the Continuum, which has no gaps [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
Raising omega to successive powers of omega reveal an infinity of infinities [Friend]
The first limit ordinal is omega (greater, but without predecessor), and the second is twice-omega [Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
Between any two rational numbers there is an infinite number of rational numbers [Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Is mathematics based on sets, types, categories, models or topology? [Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Most mathematical theories can be translated into the language of set theory [Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
The number 8 in isolation from the other numbers is of no interest [Friend]
In structuralism the number 8 is not quite the same in different structures, only equivalent [Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
Are structures 'ante rem' (before reality), or are they 'in re' (grounded in physics)? [Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Structuralist says maths concerns concepts about base objects, not base objects themselves [Friend]
Structuralism focuses on relations, predicates and functions, with objects being inessential [Friend]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
'In re' structuralism says that the process of abstraction is pattern-spotting [Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
The big problem for platonists is epistemic: how do we perceive, intuit, know or detect mathematical facts? [Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Mathematics should be treated as true whenever it is indispensable to our best physical theory [Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism is unconstrained, so cannot indicate importance, or directions for research [Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Constructivism rejects too much mathematics [Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionists typically retain bivalence but reject the law of excluded middle [Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Structuralists call a mathematical 'object' simply a 'place in a structure' [Friend]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Protagoras was the first to claim that there are two contradictory arguments about everything [Protagoras, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Man is the measure of all things - of things that are, and of things that are not [Protagoras]
There is no more purely metaphysical doctrine than Protagorean relativism [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
If my hot wind is your cold wind, then wind is neither hot nor cold, and so not as cold as itself [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
You can only state the problem of the relative warmth of an object by agreeing on the underlying object [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
God is "the measure of all things", more than any man [Plato on Protagoras]
Protagoras absurdly thought that the knowing or perceiving man is 'the measure of all things' [Aristotle on Protagoras]
Relativists think if you poke your eye and see double, there must be two things [Aristotle on Protagoras]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Galen showed by experiment that the brain controls the body [Galen, by Hankinson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen]
Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization) [Friend]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Early sophists thought convention improved nature; later they said nature was diminished by it [Protagoras, by Miller,FD]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
For Protagoras the only bad behaviour is that which interferes with social harmony [Protagoras, by Roochnik]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Protagoras contradicts himself by saying virtue is teachable, but then that it is not knowledge [Plato on Protagoras]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Galen's medicine followed the mean; each illness was balanced by opposite treatment [Galen, by Hacking]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Each part of the soul has its virtue - pleasure for appetite, success for competition, and rectitude for reason [Galen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Protagoras seems to have made the huge move of separating punishment from revenge [Protagoras, by Vlastos]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Successful education must go deep into the soul [Protagoras]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
He spent public money on education, as it benefits the individual and the state [Protagoras, by Diodorus of Sicily]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
He said he didn't know whether there are gods - but this is the same as atheism [Diogenes of Oen. on Protagoras]