Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Galen, T.H. Huxley and Peter Schulte

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Galen showed by experiment that the brain controls the body [Galen, by Hankinson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen]
Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey]
Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Galen's medicine followed the mean; each illness was balanced by opposite treatment [Galen, by Hacking]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Each part of the soul has its virtue - pleasure for appetite, success for competition, and rectitude for reason [Galen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen]