94 ideas
21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
8210 | Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida] |
8211 | The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida] |
6840 | Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley] |
21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
8216 | Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida] |
21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
8213 | I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida] |
4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
22979 | Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine] |
16129 | Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe] |
16459 | Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans] |
16460 | Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis] |
16457 | There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis] |
14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
3912 | I must exist in order to be mistaken, so that even if I am mistaken, I can't be wrong about my own existence [Augustine] |
22167 | Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas] |
7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
22117 | Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews] |
22981 | Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine] |
22980 | Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine] |
22977 | I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine] |
22983 | We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine] |
22982 | Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine] |
22978 | Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine] |
21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
22984 | Without memory I could not even speak of myself [Augustine] |
5982 | If the future does not exist, how can prophets see it? [Augustine] |
6683 | The contact of spirit and body is utterly amazing, and incomprehensible [Augustine] |
21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
22976 | Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
21932 | 'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
8212 | Everything that is experienced in consciousness is meaning [Derrida] |
21929 | Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida] |
21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
22118 | Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews] |
4348 | Love, and do what you will [Augustine] |
21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
7821 | Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling] |
22985 | Everyone wants happiness [Augustine] |
22119 | Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews] |
21936 | A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21937 | Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
5984 | Maybe time is an extension of the mind [Augustine] |
22888 | To be aware of time it can only exist in the mind, as memory or anticipation [Augustine, by Bardon] |
5980 | How can ten days ahead be a short time, if it doesn't exist? [Augustine] |
5979 | If the past is no longer, and the future is not yet, how can they exist? [Augustine] |
5981 | The whole of the current year is not present, so how can it exist? [Augustine] |
5978 | I know what time is, until someone asks me to explain it [Augustine] |
5983 | I disagree with the idea that time is nothing but cosmic movement [Augustine] |
5977 | Heaven and earth must be created, because they are subject to change [Augustine] |
22887 | If God existed before creation, why would a perfect being desire to change things? [Augustine, by Bardon] |
5976 | If God is outside time in eternity, can He hear prayers? [Augustine] |
16702 | All things are in the present time to God [Augustine] |
22116 | Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews] |
19338 | Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins] |