39 ideas
7278 | Words of wisdom are precise and clear [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
7281 | Don't even start, let's just stay put [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
7282 | Disagreement means you do not understand at all [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
7284 | If you beat me in argument, does that mean you are right? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
16519 | No one can conceive of a possible substance, apart from those which God has created [Arnauld] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
16129 | Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe] |
16459 | Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans] |
16460 | Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis] |
16457 | There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis] |
14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
7289 | Do not try to do things, or to master knowledge; just be empty [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
23403 | You know you were dreaming when you wake, but there might then be a greater awakening from that [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
7285 | Did Chuang Tzu dream he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dream he was Chuang Tzu? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
7277 | The perfect man has no self [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
7286 | To see with true clarity, your self must be irrelevant [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
7279 | If words can't be defined, they may just be the chirruping of chicks [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
23404 | Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
7283 | Great courage is not violent [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
7280 | As all life is one, what need is there for words? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
7288 | Go with the flow, and be one with the void of Heaven [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |
7287 | Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)] |