Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Gavin Hesketh, Thomas Nagel and Albert of Saxony

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


87 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel]
Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving [Nagel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel]
Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel]
Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident [Albert of Saxony]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels [Nagel]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony]
Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel]
We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture [Nagel]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel]
The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel]
As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]
If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel]
We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel]
The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel]
In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel]
Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel]
Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Elements are found last in dismantling bodies, and first in generating them [Albert of Saxony]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Relativity and Quantum theory give very different accounts of forces [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Thermodynamics introduced work and entropy, to understand steam engine efficiency [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Spinning electric charge produces magnetism, so all fermions are magnets [Hesketh]
Photons are B and W° bosons, linked by the Higgs mechanism [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons may have smaller components, bound by a new force [Hesketh]
Electrons are fundamental and are not made of anything; they are properties without size [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum mechanics is our only theory, and is very precise, and repeatedly confirmed [Hesketh]
Physics was rewritten to explain stable electron orbits [Hesketh]
Virtual particles can't be measured, and can ignore the laws of physics [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
Colour charge is positive or negative, and also has red, green or blue direction [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The Standard Model omits gravity, because there are no particles involved [Hesketh]
In Supersymmetry the Standard Model simplifies at high energies [Hesketh]
Standard Model forces are one- two- and three-dimensional [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Quarks and leptons have a weak charge, for the weak force [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Quarks rush wildly around in protons, restrained by the gluons [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, but decays produce them in huge numbers [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
To combine the forces, they must all be the same strength at some point [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
'Space' in physics just means location [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
The universe is 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, 5% regular matter [Hesketh]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 9. Fine-Tuned Universe
If a cosmic theory relies a great deal on fine-tuning basic values, it is probably wrong [Hesketh]