20 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |