17 ideas
21959 | Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW] |
1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |