15 ideas
| 19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
| 19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
| 22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
| 22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
| 19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
| 22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
| 22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
| 22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
| 22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
| 22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
| 22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
| 19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
| 20890 | Why do sexual relationships need permanence, if other relationships don't? [Punzo] |
| 20891 | Does engaging in sexual intercourse really need no more thought than playing tennis? [Punzo] |
| 22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |