19 ideas
7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
8406 | Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford] |
7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
8407 | A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford] |