15 ideas
| 15785 | Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka] |
| 15786 | Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka] |
| 22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
| 22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
| 22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
| 22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
| 22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
| 22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
| 22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
| 22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
| 22692 | A work can be morally and artistically excellent, despite rejecting moral truth [John,E] |
| 22693 | The works we value most are in sympathy with our own moral views [John,E] |
| 22694 | We should understand what is morally important in a story, without having to endorse it [John,E] |
| 22695 | We value morality in art because that is what we care about - but it is a contingent fact [John,E] |
| 22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |