90 ideas
3240 | There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel] |
3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
3242 | Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel] |
3241 | It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel] |
1489 | Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving [Nagel] |
3248 | Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel] |
20989 | Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel] |
22354 | Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
4643 | The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
4633 | You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl] |
4635 | Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl] |
4632 | 'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl] |
4631 | In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl] |
4638 | The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl] |
4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
3291 | Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels [Nagel] |
4640 | If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG] |
4647 | 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl] |
4639 | Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl] |
4646 | Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl] |
4645 | 'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl] |
3249 | Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel] |
22429 | We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel] |
3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
3247 | Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel] |
4582 | Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl] |
3271 | We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel] |
3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
3252 | Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel] |
1490 | You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture [Nagel] |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
4644 | A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl] |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
4584 | The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl] |
3251 | Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel] |
4583 | How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl] |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
4634 | Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl] |
4637 | To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
2957 | Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood] |
3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel] |
3285 | We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel] |
3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
3244 | Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel] |
3245 | The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel] |
3246 | I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel] |
3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |
4629 | Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl] |
4001 | The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel] |
6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel] |
3257 | Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel] |
3265 | We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel] |
3263 | If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel] |
3256 | Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel] |
3272 | Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel] |
6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel] |
3258 | If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel] |
6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
3282 | The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel] |
3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |
3254 | If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel] |
3264 | We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel] |
6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
3255 | We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel] |
3262 | Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel] |
3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |
3278 | An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel] |
6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel] |
3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel] |
3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel] |
3273 | Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel] |
3274 | Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel] |
6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
3276 | A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel] |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |
3290 | Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel] |