Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Geoffrey Gorham, Jos Ortega y Gassett and Curt Ducasse

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19 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
For man, being is not what he is, but what he is going to be [Ortega y Gassett]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham]
Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham]
Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham]
Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham]
For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Instead of having a nature, man only has a history [Ortega y Gassett]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]