Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Geoffrey Gorham, Karl Popper and Richard Taylor

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33 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham]
Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham]
Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham]
Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham]
For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R]
Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R]
The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]