Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Geoffrey Gorham, Michael Martin and Joseph Almog

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
6855 Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
6856 Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
17867 If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
17877 The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17872 Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog]
17871 Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog]
17866 Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog]
17868 Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17870 Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
17869 Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
17876 Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6857 An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22189 Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham]
22190 If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
22192 Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham]
22194 Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham]
22195 Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
22197 Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham]
22196 For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
22193 Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
17873 Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
22198 Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
17864 Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
17863 Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]