Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Geoffrey Gorham, Ned Markosian and Paul M. Pietroski

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham]
If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham]
Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham]
Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham]
Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
No language is semantically referential; it all occurs at the level of thought or utterance [Pietroski, by Hofweber]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian]
Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian]
Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian]
Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian]
Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian]
People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian]