Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Geoffrey Gorham, Stephen P. Stich and Alex Orenstein

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

25 ideas

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
6627 Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth [Stich, by Lowe]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
8472 Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
8476 Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
8480 S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
8474 Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
8465 Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
8452 Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
8475 The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
8454 The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8473 The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
8458 Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22190 If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham]
22189 Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
8457 The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein]
22192 Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham]
22194 Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham]
22195 Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
22197 Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham]
22196 For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
22193 Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
4765 Stich accepts eliminativism (labelled 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity [Stich, by Engel]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
8477 People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
8471 Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
8484 If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
22198 Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham]