Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Geoffrey Hellman, Richard Wollheim and Stephen Boulter

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend]
Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara]
Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman]
Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim]
Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 2. Art as Form
If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim]
Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim]
The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim]
The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim]
The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim]
A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter]