Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for George Bealer, Alexander Miller and Albert Einstein

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24 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9455 Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
9454 The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
7322 Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
7621 Special relativity, unlike general relativity, was operationalist in spirit [Putnam on Einstein]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7325 Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7323 If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
9452 Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
9453 Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
9451 Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7328 The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
7329 Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
22955 Einstein took causation to be the bedrock of physics [Einstein, by Coveney/Highfield]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
20638 General relativity assumes laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
20636 Newton is a special case of Einstein's general theory, with an infinite speed of light [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
21230 The theory is 'special' because it sticks to observers moving straight, at constant speeds [Einstein, by Farmelo]
21231 Assume the speed of light is constant for all observers, and the laws of physics are the same [Einstein, by Farmelo]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
20634 General Relativity says there is no absolute force or acceleration [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
20648 Mass is a measure of energy content [Einstein]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
21232 Space-time arises from the connection between measurements of space and of time [Einstein, by Farmelo]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
7626 I do not believe in a personal God [Einstein]