113 ideas
9955 | Contextual definitions replace a complete sentence containing the expression [George/Velleman] |
10031 | Impredicative definitions quantify over the thing being defined [George/Velleman] |
8721 | An 'impredicative' definition seems circular, because it uses the term being defined [Friend] |
8680 | Classical definitions attempt to refer, but intuitionist/constructivist definitions actually create objects [Friend] |
3678 | Reductio ad absurdum proves an idea by showing that its denial produces contradiction [Friend] |
8705 | Anti-realists see truth as our servant, and epistemically contrained [Friend] |
8713 | In classical/realist logic the connectives are defined by truth-tables [Friend] |
8708 | Double negation elimination is not valid in intuitionist logic [Friend] |
8694 | Free logic was developed for fictional or non-existent objects [Friend] |
10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
10098 | The 'power set' of A is all the subsets of A [George/Velleman] |
10099 | The 'ordered pair' <a, b>, for two sets a and b, is the set {{a, b},{a}} [George/Velleman] |
10101 | Cartesian Product A x B: the set of all ordered pairs in which a∈A and b∈B [George/Velleman] |
8665 | A 'proper subset' of A contains only members of A, but not all of them [Friend] |
8672 | A 'powerset' is all the subsets of a set [Friend] |
8677 | Set theory makes a minimum ontological claim, that the empty set exists [Friend] |
8666 | Infinite sets correspond one-to-one with a subset [Friend] |
10103 | Grouping by property is common in mathematics, usually using equivalence [George/Velleman] |
10104 | 'Equivalence' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation; 'same first letter' partitions English words [George/Velleman] |
10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
10096 | Even the elements of sets in ZFC are sets, resting on the pure empty set [George/Velleman] |
8682 | Major set theories differ in their axioms, and also over the additional axioms of choice and infinity [Friend] |
10097 | Axiom of Extensionality: for all sets x and y, if x and y have the same elements then x = y [George/Velleman] |
10100 | Axiom of Pairing: for all sets x and y, there is a set z containing just x and y [George/Velleman] |
18192 | Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy] |
17900 | The Axiom of Reducibility made impredicative definitions possible [George/Velleman] |
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
10109 | ZFC can prove that there is no set corresponding to the concept 'set' [George/Velleman] |
10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
13547 | Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter] |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
10108 | As a reduction of arithmetic, set theory is not fully general, and so not logical [George/Velleman] |
14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
10111 | Asserting Excluded Middle is a hallmark of realism about the natural world [George/Velleman] |
8709 | The law of excluded middle is syntactic; it just says A or not-A, not whether they are true or false [Friend] |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
8711 | Intuitionists read the universal quantifier as "we have a procedure for checking every..." [Friend] |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
10129 | A 'model' is a meaning-assignment which makes all the axioms true [George/Velleman] |
10105 | Differences between isomorphic structures seem unimportant [George/Velleman] |
10119 | Consistency is a purely syntactic property, unlike the semantic property of soundness [George/Velleman] |
10126 | A 'consistent' theory cannot contain both a sentence and its negation [George/Velleman] |
10120 | Soundness is a semantic property, unlike the purely syntactic property of consistency [George/Velleman] |
10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |
10127 | A 'complete' theory contains either any sentence or its negation [George/Velleman] |
13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
8675 | Paradoxes can be solved by talking more loosely of 'classes' instead of 'sets' [Friend] |
8674 | The Burali-Forti paradox asks whether the set of all ordinals is itself an ordinal [Friend] |
10106 | Rational numbers give answers to division problems with integers [George/Velleman] |
10102 | The integers are answers to subtraction problems involving natural numbers [George/Velleman] |
8667 | The 'integers' are the positive and negative natural numbers, plus zero [Friend] |
8668 | The 'rational' numbers are those representable as fractions [Friend] |
8670 | A number is 'irrational' if it cannot be represented as a fraction [Friend] |
8661 | The natural numbers are primitive, and the ordinals are up one level of abstraction [Friend] |
8664 | Cardinal numbers answer 'how many?', with the order being irrelevant [Friend] |
10107 | Real numbers provide answers to square root problems [George/Velleman] |
8671 | The 'real' numbers (rationals and irrationals combined) is the Continuum, which has no gaps [Friend] |
9946 | Logicists say mathematics is applicable because it is totally general [George/Velleman] |
10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
10125 | The classical mathematician believes the real numbers form an actual set [George/Velleman] |
10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
8663 | Raising omega to successive powers of omega reveal an infinity of infinities [Friend] |
8662 | The first limit ordinal is omega (greater, but without predecessor), and the second is twice-omega [Friend] |
8669 | Between any two rational numbers there is an infinite number of rational numbers [Friend] |
8676 | Is mathematics based on sets, types, categories, models or topology? [Friend] |
17899 | Second-order induction is stronger as it covers all concepts, not just first-order definable ones [George/Velleman] |
10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
10128 | The Incompleteness proofs use arithmetic to talk about formal arithmetic [George/Velleman] |
17902 | A successor is the union of a set with its singleton [George/Velleman] |
10133 | Frege's Theorem shows the Peano Postulates can be derived from Hume's Principle [George/Velleman] |
8678 | Most mathematical theories can be translated into the language of set theory [Friend] |
10130 | Set theory can prove the Peano Postulates [George/Velleman] |
8701 | The number 8 in isolation from the other numbers is of no interest [Friend] |
8702 | In structuralism the number 8 is not quite the same in different structures, only equivalent [Friend] |
8699 | Are structures 'ante rem' (before reality), or are they 'in re' (grounded in physics)? [Friend] |
8696 | Structuralist says maths concerns concepts about base objects, not base objects themselves [Friend] |
8695 | Structuralism focuses on relations, predicates and functions, with objects being inessential [Friend] |
8700 | 'In re' structuralism says that the process of abstraction is pattern-spotting [Friend] |
10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
10089 | Talk of 'abstract entities' is more a label for the problem than a solution to it [George/Velleman] |
8681 | The big problem for platonists is epistemic: how do we perceive, intuit, know or detect mathematical facts? [Friend] |
8712 | Mathematics should be treated as true whenever it is indispensable to our best physical theory [Friend] |
10131 | If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman] |
10092 | In the unramified theory of types, the types are objects, then sets of objects, sets of sets etc. [George/Velleman] |
10094 | The theory of types seems to rule out harmless sets as well as paradoxical ones. [George/Velleman] |
10095 | Type theory has only finitely many items at each level, which is a problem for mathematics [George/Velleman] |
17901 | Type theory prohibits (oddly) a set containing an individual and a set of individuals [George/Velleman] |
8716 | Formalism is unconstrained, so cannot indicate importance, or directions for research [Friend] |
10114 | Bounded quantification is originally finitary, as conjunctions and disjunctions [George/Velleman] |
10134 | Much infinite mathematics can still be justified finitely [George/Velleman] |
8706 | Constructivism rejects too much mathematics [Friend] |
10123 | The intuitionists are the idealists of mathematics [George/Velleman] |
10124 | Gödel's First Theorem suggests there are truths which are independent of proof [George/Velleman] |
8707 | Intuitionists typically retain bivalence but reject the law of excluded middle [Friend] |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
8704 | Structuralists call a mathematical 'object' simply a 'place in a structure' [Friend] |
10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
8685 | Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend] |
10110 | Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman] |
8688 | Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization) [Friend] |
8693 | An 'abstraction principle' says two things are identical if they are 'equivalent' in some respect [Boolos] |