83 ideas
7500 | Early Greeks cared about city and companions; later Greeks concentrated on the self [Foucault] |
15045 | The big issue since the eighteenth century has been: what is Reason? Its effect, limits and dangers? [Foucault] |
7426 | Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault] |
7423 | Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault] |
15038 | Structuralism systematically abstracted the event from sciences, and even from history [Foucault] |
7420 | When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault] |
21945 | Foucault originally felt that liberating reason had become an instrument of domination [Foucault, by Gutting] |
15044 | 'Truth' is the procedures for controlling which statements are acceptable [Foucault] |
15042 | Truth doesn't arise from solitary freedom, but from societies with constraints [Foucault] |
14480 | Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson] |
10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
18192 | Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy] |
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
13547 | Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter] |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
14471 | Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson] |
10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |
13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
14493 | Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson] |
14491 | Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson] |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
14489 | Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson] |
10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
14485 | Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson] |
14487 | The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson] |
10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
21651 | It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber] |
14486 | Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson] |
14467 | Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson] |
14479 | To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson] |
14481 | Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson] |
14482 | If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson] |
14483 | Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson] |
14476 | Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson] |
14477 | Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson] |
14478 | Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson] |
15037 | Why does knowledge appear in sudden bursts, and not in a smooth continuous development? [Foucault] |
14466 | A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson] |
21942 | Foucault challenges knowledge in psychology and sociology, not in the basic sciences [Foucault, by Gutting] |
7424 | Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault] |
21941 | Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas [Foucault, by Gutting] |
7422 | A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault] |
22235 | Feelings are not unchanging, but have a history (especially if they are noble) [Foucault] |
8693 | An 'abstraction principle' says two things are identical if they are 'equivalent' in some respect [Boolos] |
14475 | How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson] |
14474 | Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson] |
14488 | Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson] |
21939 | The author function of any text is a plurality of selves [Foucault, by Gutting] |
7419 | Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault] |
7501 | Why couldn't a person's life become a work of art? [Foucault] |
7498 | Greeks and early Christians were much more concerned about food than about sex [Foucault] |
21940 | Nature is not the basis of rights, but the willingness to risk death in asserting them [Foucault] |
15043 | Every society has a politics of truth, concerning its values, functions, prestige and mechanisms [Foucault] |
15040 | Marxists denounced power as class domination, but never analysed its mechanics [Foucault] |
15041 | Power doesn't just repress, but entices us with pleasure, artefacts, knowledge and discourse [Foucault] |
8991 | Foucault can't accept that power is sometimes decent and benign [Foucault, by Scruton] |
7425 | The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault] |
22236 | The big question of the Renaissance was how to govern everything, from the state to children [Foucault] |
21947 | Power is localised, so we either have totalitarian centralisation, or local politics [Foucault, by Gutting] |
21946 | Prisons gradually became our models for schools, hospitals and factories [Foucault, by Gutting] |
7418 | The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault] |
21116 | Power is used to create identities and ways of life for other people [Foucault, by Shorten] |
15039 | History lacks 'meaning', but it can be analysed in terms of its struggles [Foucault] |