Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for George Boolos, Iris Murdoch and David-Hillel Ruben

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61 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
An unexamined life can be virtuous [Murdoch]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy must keep returning to the beginning [Murdoch]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy moves continually between elaborate theories and the obvious facts [Murdoch]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley]
Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos]
Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
'∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
We know perfection when we see what is imperfect [Murdoch]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
An 'abstraction principle' says two things are identical if they are 'equivalent' in some respect [Boolos]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
We should first decide what are the great works of art, with aesthetic theory following from that [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Literature is the most important aspect of culture, because it teaches understanding of living [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Great art proves the absurdity of art for art's sake [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Because art is love, it improves us morally [Murdoch]
Appreciating beauty in art or nature opens up the good life, by restricting selfishness [Murdoch]
Art and morals are essentially the same, and are both identical with love [Murdoch]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is a central concept in morals [Murdoch]
Ordinary human love is good evidence of transcendent goodness [Murdoch]
Love is realising something other than oneself is real [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch]
It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Only trivial virtues can be possessed on their own [Murdoch]
Moral reflection and experience gradually reveals unity in the moral world [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Man is a brave naked will, separate from a background of values and realities [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Kantian existentialists care greatly for reasons for action, whereas Surrealists care nothing [Murdoch]
Only a philosopher might think choices create values [Murdoch]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
Moral philosophy needs a central concept with all the traditional attributes of God [Murdoch]