153 ideas
| 21852 | Nomads are the basis of history, and yet almost unknowable [Deleuze] |
| 21844 | The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze] |
| 21849 | Thought should be thrown like a stone from a war-machine [Deleuze] |
| 21845 | Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze] |
| 12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
| 13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis] |
| 20388 | 'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S] |
| 5486 | Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language [Ellis] |
| 21839 | When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze] |
| 21901 | 'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May] |
| 21841 | We must create new words, and treat them as normal, and as if designating real things. [Deleuze] |
| 21842 | Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze] |
| 21850 | Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze] |
| 20389 | A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S] |
| 20391 | Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S] |
| 13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis] |
| 12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
| 13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis] |
| 21838 | Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze] |
| 12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
| 21902 | 'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze] |
| 21908 | Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze] |
| 21899 | There is no being beyond becoming [Deleuze] |
| 21903 | Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May] |
| 21904 | Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May] |
| 21847 | Before Being there is politics [Deleuze] |
| 12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
| 12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
| 21907 | We don't want another new set of categories; we want a variety of flexible categories [Deleuze, by May] |
| 13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis] |
| 5468 | Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG] |
| 13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis] |
| 12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
| 13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis] |
| 9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis] |
| 5469 | The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis] |
| 12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
| 12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
| 12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
| 13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis] |
| 12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
| 5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis] |
| 18398 | Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers [Ellis] |
| 13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis] |
| 13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis] |
| 12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
| 13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis] |
| 13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis] |
| 5481 | Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis] |
| 23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
| 13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis] |
| 5458 | Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis] |
| 13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
| 13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
| 12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
| 13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis] |
| 13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis] |
| 12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
| 5443 | Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable [Ellis] |
| 5444 | 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis] |
| 13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis] |
| 12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
| 5462 | Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate [Ellis] |
| 5448 | 'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis] |
| 13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis] |
| 5477 | One thing can look like something else, without being the something else [Ellis] |
| 13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis] |
| 12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
| 5479 | Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
| 12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
| 5483 | Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis] |
| 13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis] |
| 5447 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis] |
| 5476 | Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis] |
| 5478 | Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis] |
| 5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis] |
| 5453 | Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction [Ellis] |
| 5466 | Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass [Ellis] |
| 12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
| 13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis] |
| 5485 | Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis] |
| 13597 | Good explanations unify [Ellis] |
| 5484 | Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour [Ellis] |
| 13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis] |
| 13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis] |
| 21840 | A meeting of man and animal can be deterritorialization (like a wasp with an orchid) [Deleuze] |
| 13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis] |
| 21843 | People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze] |
| 5457 | Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [Ellis, by PG] |
| 5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis] |
| 5489 | Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions [Ellis] |
| 20387 | Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S] |
| 20385 | The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S] |
| 20386 | The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S] |
| 20384 | The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S] |
| 20390 | Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S] |
| 20392 | 'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S] |
| 20405 | Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S] |
| 20403 | It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S] |
| 20393 | The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S] |
| 20402 | Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S] |
| 20395 | The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S] |
| 20396 | We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S] |
| 20399 | Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S] |
| 20401 | The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S] |
| 20397 | If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S] |
| 20398 | Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S] |
| 20404 | Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S] |
| 22705 | If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S] |
| 22707 | It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S] |
| 22706 | A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S] |
| 22704 | Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S] |
| 5490 | Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right [Ellis] |
| 21853 | We are currently extending capitalism to the whole of society [Deleuze] |
| 21848 | Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze] |
| 21851 | The State requires self-preservation, but the war-machine desires destruction [Deleuze] |
| 5472 | Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures [Ellis] |
| 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
| 12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
| 13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis] |
| 13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis] |
| 5471 | Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws [Ellis] |
| 12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
| 5446 | For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical [Ellis] |
| 5480 | The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws [Ellis] |
| 13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis] |
| 5445 | Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis] |
| 5463 | Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis] |
| 5491 | A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis] |
| 5442 | For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside [Ellis] |
| 5473 | The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds [Ellis] |
| 5474 | Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances [Ellis] |
| 5475 | We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws [Ellis] |
| 13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis] |
| 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
| 12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
| 5460 | Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once [Ellis] |
| 13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis] |
| 13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis] |
| 13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis] |
| 13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis] |
| 5459 | Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws [Ellis] |
| 5461 | The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell [Ellis] |
| 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
| 13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
| 5464 | For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds [Ellis] |
| 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
| 5487 | Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology [Ellis] |
| 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |
| 12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
| 12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
| 12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
| 12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |