12 ideas
| 19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
| 17619 | We renounce all abstract entities [Goodman/Quine] |
| 19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
| 19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
| 19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
| 19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
| 19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
| 19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
| 19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
| 13165 | Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus] |
| 19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
| 9569 | The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus] |