Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.A. Prichard, David E. Cooper and Carrie Jenkins

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
9254 In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
17729 Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
17740 Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
4568 If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
17730 Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17719 Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins]
17717 Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
17724 It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17727 We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17720 There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
17728 The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
4574 If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
17726 Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
17734 It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
17723 Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
4573 If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE]
4575 A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4561 Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17718 Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins]
17739 The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
4564 I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE]
4565 The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE]
17731 Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
4563 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE]
4562 Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4566 Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE]
4571 Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
17732 Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
4572 If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
17725 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
4576 An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
9261 The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
9262 The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
9256 I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
9257 The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
9260 Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
9259 We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard]
9255 Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
9258 If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]