Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.L.A. Hart, Edward N. Zalta and Simon Blackburn

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27 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer]
Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn]
If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Hart (against Bentham) says human rights are what motivate legal rights [Hart,HLA, by Sen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Positive law needs secondary 'rules of recognition' for their correct application [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J]
The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA]
Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA]
Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA]
Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA]
Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
Hart replaced positivism with the democratic requirement of the people's acceptance [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA]