47 ideas
11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
23529 | Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA] |
23530 | The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA] |
23522 | In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA] |
23528 | The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA] |
21004 | Hart (against Bentham) says human rights are what motivate legal rights [Hart,HLA, by Sen] |
23523 | The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA] |
23524 | Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA] |
23521 | Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA] |
23525 | Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA] |
23526 | Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA] |
20932 | Positive law needs secondary 'rules of recognition' for their correct application [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J] |
20931 | Hart replaced positivism with the democratic requirement of the people's acceptance [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J] |
23527 | Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA] |