18 ideas
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
3913 | Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo] |
20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |