Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Arnauld / Nicole and DH Mellor / T Crane

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11 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10502 We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
7855 Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
18258 We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
16784 Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
6120 Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
10499 We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
10501 A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
10500 No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
6121 There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
6122 No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]